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This paper proposes a spatial explicit agent-based model to evaluate the impact of agri-environment 
schemes on the spatial cohesion of agricultural landscapes in the light of habitat network patterns.  
Networks of nature reserves are being proposed as a solution when the degree of fragmentation is 
considered to endanger the long-term persistence of species diversity. Agri-environment schemes are 
supposed to give a positive contribution to these networks. The model presented in this paper 
combines the spatial dynamics in land ownership, land use and the importance of agri-environment 
schemes in conserving biodiversity through capturing the heterogeneity of individual farmers as well 
as their dynamics in a spatial-explicit landscape. The paper evaluates the effects of two different agri-
environment policies on landscape level and proofs that agri-environment schemes with flexible 
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1. Introduction 
One of the greatest challenges facing the global (human) community is the provision of sufficient food 
for an expanding population while maintaining the supply of environmental and social services that lie 
beyond routine commodity production (Hajkowicz et al., 2009 ; Whittingham, 2011). These services 
might include protecting biodiversity, improving long-term soil productivity, enhancing water quality, 
sequestering greenhouse gases, and improving landscape scenery. This has led to the emergence of 
agri-environment schemes (AESs). AESs are designed to secure environmental and social services 
from farmed landscapes. It typically involves either direct or indirect (e.g. tax breaks) payments to 
farmers to supply those services (OECD, 2005). In the European Union (EU) AESs are designed, in 
part at least, to enhance levels of biodiversity on farmland (Whittingham, 2007).  
 
A basic principle of AESs in the EU is that they commit themselves voluntarily for a period of at least 
five years. Many studies focus on the characteristics of farms and farmers who conclude AESs (e.g., 
Crabtree et al., 1998; Beedell and Rehman, 2000; Wynn et al., 2001; Vanslembrouck et al., 2002; 
Wenum, 2002). Van Huylenbroeck et al. (2000), Peerlings and Polman (2004, 2008) and Havlík et al. 
(2008) developed simulation models to evaluate the impact of AESs on farm production and economic 
results, in order to better explain contract choice. This paper adds to this literature by including spatial 
and institutional dynamics in land ownership and intensity of land use on the uptake of AESs. For this 
purpose we developed an agent-based model (see Parker et al., 2003) to capture heterogeneity between 
agents (farmers) as well as dynamics through a spatial explicit model, specifically designed for 
simulations of the effects of agri-environmental policies on agricultural landscape level. Agent-based 
models (ABMs) within the specific agricultural context were pioneered by Balmann (1997) with the 
Agricultural Policy Simulator (AgriPoliS). ABMs allow representing economic and social systems as 
the result of individually acting agents. When applied to agriculture, they can simulate, at the micro-
level, the behaviour of individual farmers, without the need of aggregating them in „representative‟ 
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agents, and then generate the macro (aggregate)-evidence. Furthermore, ABMs can catch the iterations 
of the heterogeneous farms when competing over common finite resources, such as land (Lobianco 
and Esposti, 2010). 
  
This paper addresses the contribution of the individual contracts to the spatial cohesion of landscapes 
in the light of habitat network patterns. The importance of habitat network spatial patterns is widely 
accepted among ecologists (Opdam et al., 2003) and is also important in the European policy context 
as shown by the Natura 2000 networks.  Where nature conservation is one of the functions competing 
for space, quantitative tools that relate the spatial conditions in the landscape to conservation goals are 
needed (Opdam et al., 1995). Because often appropriate data are not available, the planning practice is 
in need for tools that are independent of actual species distribution data. Therefore it is needed to 
assess a specific landscape pattern for the potential to conserve biodiversity. So our dilemma is that we 
must be able to „read‟ the landscape pattern for its potential to conserve biodiversity, whereas species 
differ greatly in the spatial scale at which they respond to landscape features, as well as in the features 
they are responsive to (Andrén, 1996; Vos et al., 2001; Fahrig, 2001; Kleijn et al., 2006). This implies 
that there is no simple and direct way to transform landscape features into an index for conservation 
potential. Existing tools with predictive power either are at the species level, and too complex to apply 
in multi-species planning, or difficult to generalize and depend on distribution data (empirical 
regression models). Based on this overview, we introduce a landscape cohesion method based on data 
that are available: size of the area and spatial configuration. This allows to combine economic 
governance and planning with ecological objectives. Therefore the following research question can be 
formulated: What is the contribution of agri-environment schemes to landscape cohesion in habitat 
network spatial patterns under different economic governance structures? 
 
This paper is organised in four sections. Section 2 describes the methodological approach underlying 
the proposed spatial explicit agent-based model. After a short introduction of agent-based modelling 
applied to agricultural landscapes (2.1), the section focuses on two key modelling issues, modelling 
farmers behaviour (2.2) and making space explicit (2.3), and then describe how the model is structured 
(2.4). A case-study is then presented in section 3, and results of this application are discussed in 
section 4 where the model is applied to two alternative scenarios. We conclude in Section 5 with a 
discussion of the methods applied in this paper.  
 
2. The agent-based model 
 
2.1 Conceptual framework 
 
The core of the model discussed in this paper is the understanding and modelling of an agricultural 
landscape as an agent-based system, thereby taking into account both the farmers‟ behaviour and the 
spatial configuration of the landscape. The model focuses on an actual agricultural region, and 
comprises a large number of individually acting farms that operate in the region, as well as farmers‟ 
interactions with each other and with parts of their environment. This model adds to the existing 
agricultural agent-based models, in that it provides a spatial-explicit landscape in which land 
ownership and (intensity of) land use is based on empirical data. Empirical data on individual farms 
and the existing regional landscape spatial structures have been initialized in the model. Also the 
extension of the model with the application of AESs is new, and to the best of our knowledge has not 
been previously performed. The software code of this model is written in the object-oriented 
programming language Java using the open-source agent-based modelling framework Recursive 
Porous Agent Simulation Toolkit Symphony (REPAST, http://repast.sourceforge.net/).   
 
In the following we present a basic overview of the model; those interested in the model code may 
directly contact the authors.  
 
2.2 The farm agent and the auctioneer 
The current version of the model contains three types of agents, the TraderAgent,  the Auctioneer and 
the Government. The model contains one such TraderAgent, the farmer. Every farmer has a Valuation 
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Strategy that it uses to determine a (private) price for the goods it wishes to trade. Currently, the only 
tradable goods in the model are farmlands. The strategy used is organized through decision rules 
which keep track of the total number of parcels in use, the farmers‟ age, expectations about future land 
prices, as well as a number of financial indicators and changes as a result of the farm agent‟s actions. 
The farm agent keeps track of its nitrogen and feed production through balances at farm level. The 
most important decision rule of every farm agent is to calculate the parcels contribution to the farm 
income, given limited rationality of the farm agents. According to Happe et al. (2006) this assumption 
is reasonable for agricultural enterprises in Western Europe, where farming systems that follow 
different behavioural objectives such as subsistence farming only play a minor role.  
 
Different implementations can be used in the model for different aspects of the agent‟s „daily 
operations‟. The farm agent decisions are exclusively based on their own situation and on the 
expectations about land prices. When the profit contribution of a specific parcel is known, firstly 
decisions can be made by the farm agent with respect to trading land. Secondly, farmers who land that 
is eligible can submit a tender for enrolling in an agri-environment scheme. They base their tender 
price on opportunity costs.  
 
The second agent currently in the model is the Auctioneer. The Auctioneer is a mediator between 
traders and can be representing an actual person or organisation, or - in a more abstract manner -  a 
market. The Auctioneer „requests‟ traders to make offers to either express their willingness to buy or 
sell a good. The Auctioneer „uses‟ a mechanism to match bids and asks to clear the auction. Currently, 
the model contains a mechanism that uses an heuristic to clear the auction in a number of iterations. It 
presumes that multiple buyers and sellers are present and parcels are heterogeneous (characterised by 
multiple attributes).  
 
At the start of each auction the auctioneer informs the traders that the auction is open. Based on the 
outcome of the farm agent decision-making rules (does the agent want to buy or sell?), traders can 
respond by expressing interest in the auction. Next, the auctioneer requests all interested agents to 
provide the parcels they would like to sell with a related reserve price for these parcels. This reserve 
price is determined by the valuation strategy the agent is applying. Once all asks have been identified, 
the auctioneer request the interested agents to provide bids for the parcels on offer. A prospective 
buyer evaluates all available goods and is allowed to create one bid, for the asks that he or she values 
the most. Again, this is decided by the agent‟s valuation strategy. 
 
After all bids have been collected, the auction mechanism matches bids and asks based on creation of 
the largest buyer/seller surplus (difference between bid price and reserve price). The auctioneer will 
inform the traders involved in an accepted bid, who then complete the transaction and are asked to 
provide new offers, or can update or retract their open bids and asks in the auction, based on their 
valuation and decision-making rules. 
 
If there are still unaccepted asks left after the matching process, a new cycle or iteration of the auction 
is started, in which all participating agents are again asked to provide a bid for one of the remaining 
asks. The process continues until there are no asks left, or no more bids are made. The auctioneer will 
then inform all interested traders that the auction is closed. In order to calculate the transaction prices 
for all matched bids in the auction, the auctioneer uses a pricing policy in which the surplus is equally 
shared. 
  
2.3 Spatial representation and use of the spatial cohesion Reilly index 
The spatial explicit landscape is represented by modeling actual parcels in the studied region. Within 
this spatial explicit environment, several institutional and bio-physical attributes are associated with 
each of these parcels: for each parcel the ownership is known, the parcel size, current land use and the 
possibilities for AESs. Decisions of the government on eligibility of parcels for AES is exogenous for 
the model. Also the parcel quality for farming is known and provides information about soil quality 
and crop suitability as well as ground water tables. In the model, we distinguish between three 
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different types of land, namely grass land, maize land and parcels with AESs. For each parcel, the 
distance to the agent‟s farmstead is taken into account in the model.  
 
Decision rules for the government agent on accepting parcels are included in the model. The 
government agent can either accept or reject an offer of a farmer to be contracted. The government can 
apply different strategies for accepting parcels. It can accept every parcel offered by farmers for AES 
which is the current policy standard. An alternative decision rule could be based on specific 
characteristics of parcels or bids of farmers which will be discussed below. 
 
The potential of the parcel to conserve biodiversity, by means of its location and the landscape 
configuration is taken into account. For each parcel, either conventional, with AESs or possibility for 
AESs, the spatial cohesion Reilly index is calculated (see the Appendix for method). In this way, 
information is provided on the (potential) contribution of the parcel to the long term persistence of 
network populations within habitat networks in the landscape (Opdam et al., 2003). To be able to 
assess the potential of a specific landscape pattern to conserve biodiversity we introduce a method to 
calculate the importance of individual plots for landscape cohesion based on spatial data. For this 
paper, we want to assess the specific AES sites for their potential to conserve biodiversity thereby 
taking into account their spatial configuration in the surrounding landscape as a way to deal with 
spatial effectiveness of AES. A number of recent studies have highlighted the importance of the 
surrounding landscape on the effectiveness of AESs. Whittingham (2011) demonstrates that at 
landscape scale, the effect of AESs on farmland biodiversity has been shown to be positively related to 
the extent of nature conservation area and land under AESs in the surrounding landscape.  
 
An AES site located near or in a nature conservation area has a higher spatial cohesion Reilly index 
score than a site that is located further away. Also larger sites result in a higher spatial cohesion 
Reilly-index when compared to smaller sites. In section 3, the index is integrated into a spatially 
explicit agent-based model framework. This model captures both the spatial dynamics in land 
ownership and land use on the uptake of AESs, but also contributes to the sustainable management of 
biodiversity in agricultural landscapes by making use of the spatial cohesion Reilly index elaborated 
on in this section. Finally, it can be the case that there are parcels with a higher spatial cohesion Reilly 
index than those within a designated area for AES. In those cases other variables not included in the 
spatial cohesion Reilly index could have been taken into account. As can be seen in section 3, this 
information can be used for policy evaluation, i.e. to adjust levels of compensatory payments for AESs 
or in other words the valuation function of the government. 
 
2.4 Model flow of one simulation period 
Figure 2.1 provides an overview of the dynamics of the model, and the course of events during one 
simulation period. The model consists of an initialization module in which data is conditioned to be 
used in the model, a farm module allowing the calculations of farm income contribution, a land lease 
market module distributing the land among the farmers, and an output module. The initialization 
module contains exogenous agricultural census data (reference year 2008). The attributes on farm level 
are the farm structure, given in age, type of farm, size and number of total owned and rented parcels. 
At parcel level, attributes are soil quality, crop suitability and land use. At landscape level, attributes 
are number of farms in the region, spatial land characteristics, size and distance. These attributes do 
not change during the simulation period. The determination whether conventional farming or an AES 
is chosen and the derivation of farm organization takes place in the farm module. Each farm agent is 
equipped with a behavioral model that guides decisions and keeps track of the agent‟s internal state 
described by attributes such as age, location and size. According to their behavioral model, the 






Figure 2.1 Course of events during one simulation period 
 
The results of the farm module for individual farms are merged in the land lease market module. A 
description of the land lease market module was given in the previous section. Finally the function of 
the output module is the conditioning of the model results for the next simulation period. Results on  
farm level as well as on the regional level are used for update farm attributes and regional attributes in 
the next period. 
 
3. Empirical data and model initialization 
 
3.1 The study region Winterswijk 
We adapted the model to the agricultural region Winterswijk located in the eastern part of the 
Netherlands. From a landscape perspective,  the area represents a cultural-historic landscape where 
small-scale agriculture and nature areas are closely related providing particular cultural, recreational, 
ecological and economic value to the region (Provincie Gelderland, 2005). The spatial structure of the 
landscape attributes are characterized as small fields surrounded by hedges or wooded banks 
(Mastboom, 1996). Large parts of the region contain important nature conservation areas which 
belong to the National Ecological Network (NEN) which is part of the European Natura 2000 network. 
In the 1990s, the Dutch government launched the NEN as a structure of existing nature areas that was 
to be made more robust and cohesive by enlarging areas, improving environmental quality, and 
developing new areas and local ecological corridors (Opdam et al., 2008). In this way, the NEN 







Figure 3.1 The study region Winterswijk 
 
Figure 3.1 gives an overview of the study region. From figure 3.1 follows that nature areas and 
designated areas for AESs are mainly concentrated in the southern part of the region. Areas not 
included in the model are white. The main urban area is the city Winterswijk.    
 
3.2 Model initialization 
This study concentrates on dairy farms, both specialised dairy farms and mixed dairy/pig fattening 
farms. For the model initialization, 206 individual farms are distinguished, each of which are taken 
from the Agricultural Census. For the model initialization, their actual number of dairy cows, age and 
land use is included. In the model initialization the model uses ownership, size and distance to 
farmstead for every single parcel. These characteristics are derived from Cadastral GIS-maps. GIS-
maps on land use, soil quality, crop suitability and water tables were used to integrate the production 
characteristics of individual parcels in the model. These dairy farmers are typical for the region (13150 
ha; 5846 parcels), and together they cover 60% of the main production area in the region. The size of 
the nature conservation areas in the region is 3565 ha (289 parcels). 
 
The farms are assumed to operate with production techniques that are considered to be typical for the 
region. The required coefficients regarding production, calculations of marginal values and income 
contributions are derived from FADN data. Regarding AESs on grassland, the potential uptake is 128 
ha for the farms in the sample and consists of 63 parcels. Data on this matter was distributed by the 
Dutch Ministry of Economic Affairs, Agriculture and Innovation by means of GIS-maps with potential 
contract area for the year 2008. Whenever there is an uptake of AESs, the farmer obliges itself for a 
period of six years.  
 
3.2 Policy scenarios 
As stated in section 2.3, the potential of a parcel to conserve biodiversity, by means of its location and 
the landscape configuration is inherited in the model by means of the spatial cohesion Reilly index. It 
is assumed that the maximum budget available for AESs on 128 ha in the study region amounts 
approximately 130,000 euros. This amount is calculated by the sum of the assigned parcels for AESs 
times the compensatory payment per hectare. At this moment, the compensatory payment is a fixed 
amount per hectare, independent of location, parcel quality or spatial configuration in the landscape. 
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For this paper, we calculate the spatial cohesion Reilly index for each individual parcel with AESs or 
possibility for AESs. The total number of spatial cohesion Reilly points, assigned to the parcels is 
equal to about 62,000. From the perspective of landscape cohesion and the contribution to spatial 
cohesion of individual parcels, it is beneficial to link payments to the spatial cohesion Reilly index. 
We calculate the compensatory payment per individual Reilly point by dividing the total budget by the 
total number of assigned Reilly points. For this paper, we define two policy scenarios on which model 
simulations are ran: 
 Base scenario: fixed AES compensatory payments;  
For the base run scenario we assume a fixed annual AES compensatory payment per hectare, 
independent of location and spatial configuration in the landscape. This scenario is in line with 
current European AES programmes. The government agent decision rule is to accept every 
parcel offered. 
 Spatial differentiated scenario: flexible compensatory payments based on contracted Reilly 
points;  
For this alternative scenario, we assume a flexible compensatory payment per hectare, based 
on the contracted Reilly points for the particular parcel.  In this way, information is added with 
respect to the contribution of the parcel to the long term persistence of populations within 
habitat networks in the case study region. This contract type allows for higher payments for 
plots that contribute more to the habitat networks. It is assumed that every eligible farm agent 
tenders for a contract. The spatial differentiated government decision rule is to select those 
bids maximizing Reilly points. 
 
We simulate different levels of fixed compensatory payment per hectare by running the model for 
different budget sizes. For different budget sizes we analyze the contribution to landscape cohesion 
and habitat networks by showing the average number of contracted Reilly points on the contracted 
parcels in the simulation period for both scenarios.  
 
4. Simulation results 
 
The result of the simulations are shown in Table 4.1 and 4.2. Table 4.1 reports both the base run 
scenario and the alternative scenario for the percentage contracted AES area. We calibrated the model 
on the current contracted area in the region, namely 60% of the designated AES area.  
 
Table 4.1 Percentage of AES-eligible area contracted for base run with fixed AES payment and alternative with 
spatial differentiated payments under the current budget and a budget increase and decrease 
Scenario Current budget* Budget plus 50% Budget minus 50% 
Sc 1 Base: fixed AES 
payment 
60% 81% 28% 
Sc 2 Spatial differentiated 
payment 
25% 38% 14% 
*
Calibrated on current contracted area 
Table 4.1 shows that the base run scenario results in a higher contracted AES area. When the 
expenditures are simulated, it can be concluded that the base scenario results in small change in the 
area contracted whereas the area increases almost by 50% in the spatial differentiated areas. If the 
budget is half of the current budget the area contracted drops with more than 50% in the base run and a 
bit less than 50% in the spatial differentiated scenario. Table 4.2 gives an overview of the percentage 




Table 4.2 Percentage of Reilly points contracted for base run with fixed AES payment and alternative with 
spatial differentiated payments under the current budget and a budget increase and decrease  
Scenario Current budget* Budget plus 50% Budget minus 50% 
Sc 1 Base: fixed AES 
payment 
65% 85% 55% 
Sc 2 Spatial differentiated 
payment 
71% 84% 61% 
*
Calibrated on current contracted area 
 
Table 4.2 shows that the alternative scenario, based on the spatially differentiated payment per hectare 
results in a higher percentage of Reilly points contracted. It can be concluded that the alternative 
scenario results in a higher contribution to landscape cohesion. If the budget increases/decreases by 
50% the effects are relatively larger with respect to the amount of Reilly points contracted in the base 
scenario compared to the spatial differentiated payments.   
 
The results showed that assuming a flexible compensatory payment rate based on spatial configuration 
and size can result in higher gains for habitat networks in agricultural landscapes, and thereby is 
assumed to contribute to the development of biodiversity in the studied region.  
 
5. Conclusion and discussion 
 
This paper shows how the use of spatial explicit agent-based models can contribute to the evaluation 
and development of policies with regard to AESs. The model provides better understanding of the 
social-ecological system dynamics, and the role of individual decision making for landscape 
management. The model can assist in the identification, design and evaluation of policy interventions 
and can inform the governance processes focusing on AESs. The results indicate that whenever policy 
makers are targeted at achieving the highest amount of AES area, independent of spatial configuration, 
the current fixed compensatory payments are preferable. Whenever policy makers want to achieve the 
highest contribution to the spatial habitat network through their AES policy, they could consider 
spatially differentiated payments.  
 
The model presented in this paper aims to map the individual decision behaviour of farmers as well as 
their spatial configuration in the surrounding landscape. Nevertheless, some caveats of the model exist 
with regard to the farm agents behaviour and the spatial configuration of AES area in the model. A 
caveat is that potential public and private transaction costs of schemes (see Mettepenningen et al., 
2009) are not taken into account. Further, it is assumed that all farmers with parcels that are eligible 
will tender for their opportunity cost. The model could be extended by including auction mechanisms 
dependent on Reilly points (see for auction mechanism for instance Glebe, 2008). With regard to the 
farm agents behaviour, their behaviour is limitedly rational, meaning that the decision making process 
of the farm agent is path dependent, and not globally optimizing. Another caveat is that investment 
activities as well as off-farm labour activities are not included in the model.  
 
With respect to the spatial configuration of AESs in the model, it would be a valuable model extension 
to let loose the assigned locations of parcels for AESs. It would be interesting to see what the 
behaviour of farm agents will be whenever all parcels in the case study area could be contracted. 
Another interesting model extension considers the spatial cohesion Reilly index. Now, the spatial 
cohesion Reilly index is calculated once for each parcel. It would be interesting to see what happens if 
we re-calculate the Reilly index after each simulation period, thereby taking into account the dynamics 
of other AES-parcels and their location with regard to nature conservation areas  within each run. We 
also should mention that the landscape cohesion method used in this paper is pretty rough and should 
not be used when there is a lot of detail required on i.e. the role of habitat quality of particular species. 
By using the proposed method, much detail is exchanged for simplicity and generality. However, for 
most regional planning and governance this could be sufficient. Finally, thorough calibration and 
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The Reilly index derives from Newton‟s law of gravitation, where gravity is stronger for larger 
„bodies‟ and gravitational strength is inversely related to the distance between „bodies‟. It was 
originally applied to the study of retail markets (Reilly, 1931), to reflect the attractiveness of different 
retail areas (cities) in terms of the trade-off between consumers‟ travel costs and the size of alternative 
retail areas. We modify the Reilly index to calculate the impact of surrounding nature conservation 
areas on the potential for biodiversity conservation by sites with AESs. We employ distance to nature 
conservation areas. Rather than population, we use the size of the nature conservation areas (measured 
in square meters). Equation (1) gives the formula for the calculation of the spatial cohesion Reilly-
index. The calculation of the spatial cohesion Reilly-index starts at the point where the site (measured 
in square meters) is located. After that, the size of the nature conservation areas (abbreviation NCA) 
within a certain radius (i.e. 5 km) is determined, as well as the size of the AES site. Based on the sum 
of all the distances of the site to the nature conservation areas located within the chosen radius, and on 
the size of the nature conservation areas and AES sites, the spatial cohesion Reilly-index can be 
calculated (Equation 1). Distance is measured in meters, size in squared meters.  
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The index captures, in one number, the size of the nature conservation area in proximity to the AES 
site, and the distance from the site to certain nature conservation areas (Cotteleer, 2008). Strong points 
of the spatial cohesion Reilly index are the combination of distance with size, and the fact that nature 
conservation areas located further away or which are smaller in size are weighted less. As such, the 
spatial cohesion Reilly index is a measure for the share of land used for a certain land-use function in 






Figure 1 Graphically presentation of the spatial cohesion Reilly-index  
 
We illustrate the calculation of the spatial cohesion Reilly-index in Table 1 and Figure 1 for the 
location of two AES-sites: A and B. The two sites (A and B) are heterogeneous in size and are situated 
in the proximity of four different nature conservation areas. The size of the four nature conservation 
areas is also given. Figure 1 shows the two sites, and their location in relation to the four nature 
conservation areas. The arrows in Figure 1 give the distance to the four nature conservation areas. The 
size and distance correspond with Table 1.  
 
Table 1 Spatial cohesion Reilly-index for two AES sites given the size of sites and NCA and the distance to the 
NCA 
NCA NCA size (m2) Size site A 
(m2) 
Distance to 
site A  
(m) 
Size /  
(Distance)2 
Size of site B 
(m2) 
Distance to 
site B  
(m) 
Size /  
(Distance)2 
1 1,000,000 20,000 1,000 1.02 40,000 1,400 0.53061 
2 500,000  2,100 0.11791  400 3.375 
3 200,000  600 0.61111  700 0.4898 




  2.38791   5.5559  
Source: Adapted from Cotteleer (2008, p.101) and adjusted. 
From Table 1 and Figure 1, it is apparent that for site B, the spatial cohesion Reilly index is much 
larger than for site A, because site B is located closer to one of the nature conservation areas. Although 
location 2 of the nature conservation area is not the largest area, the shorter distance from site B to this 
area is largely responsible for the larger Reilly score for this site.  
 
NCA 1, 
size: 100 ha 
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